Wireless Network Slicing: Generalized Kelly Mechanism Based Resource
  Allocation by Tun, Yan Kyaw et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
02
18
2v
2 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 5 
Ju
l 2
01
9
1
Wireless Network Slicing: Generalized Kelly
Mechanism Based Resource Allocation
Yan Kyaw Tun, Nguyen H. Tran, Senior Member, IEEE, Duy Trong Ngo, Member, IEEE,
Shashi Raj Pandey, Zhu Han, Fellow, IEEE, and Choong Seon Hong, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Wireless network slicing (i.e., network virtualiza-
tion) is one of the potential technologies for addressing the issue
of rapidly growing demand in mobile data services related to
5G cellular networks. It logically decouples the current cellular
networks into two entities; infrastructure providers (InPs) and
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). The resources of
base stations (e.g., resource blocks, transmission power, antennas)
which are owned by the InP are shared to multiple MVNOs who
need resources for their mobile users. Specifically, the physical
resources of an InP are abstracted into multiple isolated network
slices, which are then allocated to MVNO’s mobile users. In
this paper, two-level allocation problem in network slicing is
examined, whilst enabling efficient resource utilization, inter-
slice isolation (i.e., no interference amongst slices), and intra-
slice isolation (i.e., no interference between users in the same
slice). A generalized Kelly mechanism (GKM) is also designed,
based on which the upper level of the resource allocation issue
(i.e., between the InP and MVNOs) is addressed. The benefit
of using such a resource bidding and allocation framework is
that the seller (InP) does not need to know the true valuation
of the bidders (MVNOs). For solving the lower level of resource
allocation issue (i.e., between MVNOs and their mobile users),
the optimal resource allocation is derived from each MVNO
to its mobile users by using KKT conditions. Then, bandwidth
resources are allocated to the users of MVNOs. Finally, the results
of simulation are presented to verify the theoretical analysis of
our proposed two-level resource allocation problem in wireless
network slicing.
Index Terms—Generalized Kelly Mechanism, resource alloca-
tion, wireless network virtualization, wireless network slicing.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, wireless networks have faced with an explo-sive growth of mobile data traffic because of the dramatic
increase in the use of mobile devices, and consequently, data
greedy applications. To address the ever growing network traf-
fic, in recent years, wireless network slicing has been a central
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topic of research. Wireless network slicing decouples mobile
network operators (MNOs) in the current wireless network into
two bodies: InPs and MVNOs. The physical wireless network
including physical infrastructure such as base stations, cell
sites, radio towers, antennas, physical resource blocks (RBs),
backhaul, core network, transmission networks, transmission
power, etc., are owned and operated by an InP. Physical
resources from multiple InPs are leased by the MVNOs to
create their own virtual networks for delivering particular
services such as VoIP, live streaming, video conferencing,
and video telephony, to their network users. By enabling the
sharing of physical resources, wireless network slicing enables
effective reduction in operational expenditures (OPEX) and
capital expenditures (CAPEX) of mobile network operators
(MNOs). It also enables a flexible network operation by
facilitating the coexistence of multiple MVNOs on a shared
infrastructure [1].
Though network slicing is the potential technology for
future mobile networks, there remains several challenging
issues to address. Among them, one important issue is how
to efficiently slice and split radio resources (i.e., bandwidth
or physical RBs) into multiple slices for MVNOs who must
meet the dynamic demands of their mobile end users, whilst
ensuring the key requirements of inter-slice and intra-slice
isolation [2], [3]. In this regards, as defined in 5G architecture
proposed by [4], virtualization of network functions relies on
network function virtualization (NFV) and software defined
network (SDN) technologies. Specifically, NFV enables the
abstraction of the resources and facilitates in sharing them
among multiple tenants for future network services [5]. Here,
the virtualization layer, referred to as a hypervisor, enables
an agile network environment which is managed by the
SDN-based open standard application programming interface
(API). A number of SDN controllers have been developed
to enable a flexible and programmable radio access network
(RAN), namely the SD-RAN platform [6], [7], [8]. In [2], the
authors designed a virtualization substrate, in particular a flow
scheduler, and implemented it to meet the key requirements
of efficient resource utilization, customization, and isolation in
wireless resource virtualization. In [7], the authors designed
the controller, namely FlexRAN that uses an agent API which
transparently communicates to UEs. The control protocols
of such controller can make scheduling decisions such as
resource block allocation. With the software enabler, the
eNodeB only has to handle the data plane and the operations
such as obtaining and setting the configurations, applying
the scheduling decisions, maintaining the flow and so on
2are abstracted via the control plane with the help functions
provided by the APIs. Similar to these described virtualized
wireless network architecture based on SDN in [9], [10],
[11], [12], network slicing functionality can be considered one
instance of the virtual machine (VM) in our proposed system
model.
Efficient resource allocation helps to improve resource uti-
lization, ensures the quality of services for the end users and
furthermore, provides energy efficiency. The resource alloca-
tion problem in wireless network slicing is more challenging
when selfish agents (i.e., MVNOs) are involved. Therefore,
under such scenario where the agents act greedily, it is impor-
tant to design an appropriate incentive plan in order to achieve
social efficiency. In this regard, to address the challenges in
the efficient resource allocation in wireless network slicing,
two prominent frameworks are implemented in the wireless
network slicing. In the first approach, the InP acts as a central
player and can directly allocate resources to mobile users
of MVNOs as per the predetermined resource requirement.
In the second approach, MVNOs take part in the resource
scheduling to their users instead of the InP. Firstly, the InP
interacts with MVNOs and allocates resources to them. Then,
the MVNOs will manage the individual resource allocation
(i.e., scheduling) to their own mobile users. Therefore, with
the involvement of MVNOs, the resource allocation design
corresponds as a two-level problem. Most of the existing
research works investigated the first resource allocation design
where they ignored the role of MVNOs [13], [14], [15],
[16]. Unlike existing works that only focus on maximizing
network utilization, our problem formulation considers the
network economics issue in wireless network slicing. It in-
cludes monetary profit to the InP in terms of efficient resource
allocation strategy for multiple associated MVNOs, and the
corresponding economic interactions between MVNOs and its
users. In this work under wireless network slicing, we focus
on the two-level resource allocation problem to maximize the
individual and the aggregate valuation of MVNOs. Here, the
most important challenge is the resource allocation among
MVNOs with fairness guarantee.
Under the aforementioned challenges, we design a general-
ized Kelly mechanism (GKM) [17] to address the upper-level
problem and make use of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) con-
ditions in addressing the lower-level of the resource allocation
problem. The GKM belongs to one of the auction algorithms
where each agent (i.e., MVNO) can submit an individual bid
for resources to the seller (i.e, InP), while an InP receives bids
from different MVNOs and then allocates resources to each
bidding agent (i.e., MVNO) proportionally to their bidding val-
ues [18]. The Kelly mechanism (KM) [19] is suitable for price-
taking agents, i.e., agents who have no power to influence
the market price of the available resources with their bidding
value. That is only possible when there are a large number
of agents (i.e., MVNOs) in the resource allocation auction.
However, the GKM is suitable for both price-anticipating and
price-taking agents. Here, the price-anticipating agent means
an agent’s bidding value can influence the market price of the
resources. Such price anticipating agents’ bidding values may
lead to loss in efficiency, and the social welfare (i.e., sum of
all MVNO’s valuation). At that time, GKM can reduce the
loss of efficiency. Note that there are several effective auction
mechanisms such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [20]
which focuses on the scenario where the agents bid truthfully,
i.e., every agent has to submit its true valuation as a bid.
However, as valuation is the private information of agents,
they will not submit it to the seller. In the GKM, even if the
agents do not submit their true valuations, the seller can still
induce the marginal valuations of the agents.
A. Research Contributions
In order to address the challenges and issues of resource
allocation in wireless network slicing as mentioned above, we
propose an efficient resource allocation framework by using
the GKM. Summary to our main contributions is:
• Firstly, a two-level resource allocation problem in wire-
less network slicing is proposed. Then, the GKM is
designed to address the upper-level of the proposed
resource allocation problem. In the GKM, MVNOs will
submit their individual bidding values to the InP in
order to request wireless resources. The InP will further
allocate its physical resources to MVNOs according to
their bidding values. Then, each MVNO will use that
wireless resources allocated by the InP to serve its mobile
users. The most important challenges of the resource
allocation in the network slicing such as isolation and
fairness between MVNOs are handled by the proposed
problem formulation.
• We next perform the theoretical analysis of GKM proper-
ties such as the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium,
and the optimal resource allocation to MVNOs under the
Nash equilibrium. Then, we analyze the influence power
of each bidder (i.e., MVNO) in the market which is the
ability of the MVNO to change the market price of the
resources. To control the market influence power of the
bidders (i.e., MVNOs), the seller (i.e., InP) introduces the
penalty value that is attached with the cost for each bidder
in GKM. We further analyze the effect of this penalty
value for each MVNO under the Nash equilibrium.
• Finally, we use KKT conditions to address the lower-
level of the proposed problem (i.e., between MVNOs
and their mobile end users), and provide the closed-form
solution to this problem. Moreover, we also consider an
incomplete information scenario in which each MVNO
does not know the channel condition of its mobile users
due to estimation error, or wireless channel delay. We
further extend our work into multiple resources scenario
where each MVNO requests multiple resources (e.g.,
bandwidth, power) from an InP.
• In simulation section, we first present the resource al-
located to MVNOs under the GKM. Then, we com-
pare the achieved valuation of each MVNOs under pro-
posed GKM with others: Equal Sharing, traditional Kelly
mechanism, and Optimal solution. The proposed scheme
achieves a significant performance gain: up to 13%, and
9% in comparison to Equal Sharing, and traditional Kelly
mechanism with our proposed algorithm, respectively.
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Fig. 1: A model of wireless network slicing.
We also observe that our proposed solution framework
achieves near Optimal solution. Further, we also demon-
strate the allocated bandwidth to each user of MVNO
under KKT conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
summarizes related works. The system model and wireless
network slicing framework are introduced in Section III. Sec-
tion IV presents the two-level resource allocation problem in
wireless network slicing and proposes the solution mechanism.
The extension of our proposed multiple resource allocation
problem in wireless network slicing is presented in Section
V. Section VI discusses about the simulation results. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Resource layer, along with network slice instance layer, and
service instance layer is one of the integral parts of network
slicing in 5G architecture proposed by [4]. A network slice
supports at least one type of service, and should be mutu-
ally isolated, manageable and support multi-tenants, multi-
services [21], [22]. In this regard, the recent 3GPP R15 [23]
specifications and standards define tailored services such as
massive machine type communication (mMTC), ultra reliable
and low latency communications (URLLC), and enhanced
mobile broadband (eMBB). Therefore, a proper design of
the resource allocation solution that is flexible, scalable and
demand-oriented in wireless virtualization has to be done,
which is the scope of this paper.
Proportional allocation (i.e., Kelly mechanism) in one-sided
resource allocation auction was investigated in [24], [25]. They
showed that under the assumption of price-taking agents, Kelly
mechanism achieves maximum value of social welfare. In
order to reduce the loss efficiency gap and the market influence
power of the price-anticipating agents, [26] studied a GKM
by setting a penalty value for each price-participating agent
according to their bid. Moreover, the theoretical limitations of
both GKM and Kelly mechanism were presented in [27].
In [28], the authors have proposed a stochastic game-based
spectrum allocation in virtualized wireless networks. Although
the proposed resource allocation scheme achieved higher re-
source utilization, MVNOs are not considered in resource
allocation design. Moreover, as InP manages resources and
allocates it directly to the mobile users of MVNOs in a
centralized manner, the computation complexity is high.
The work of [29], [30] introduced a joint resource allocation
and admission control strategy for an orthogonal frequency
division multiple access (OFDMA) based virtualized wireless
network. Here, both resource-based and rate-based MVNOs
were considered, and a joint optimization problem for power
and resource allocation was formulated for maximizing the
overall sum rate of the corresponding MVNOs. But the
significance of MVNOs was ignored in [29], [30] and the
user scheduling was instead performed by the base stations
of the InP. The dynamic resource management in wireless
virtualized networks was proposed in [31]. The developed dy-
namic resource sharing approach can result in higher resource
utilization and better system efficiency.
In [32], the authors introduced an auction game model
for the users to bid for radio resources. Moreover, auction
mechanism based power allocation in the LTE air interface vir-
tualization was proposed in [33]. The authors of [34] proposed
an LTE framework with an added entity called “hypervisor” at
a base station. The hypervisor enables sharing of RBs among
the MVNOs without interfering with each other. In [35], a
combination of wireless network virtualization and massive
MIMO was considered. Then, the authors formulated a re-
source (i.e., bandwidth, power, antennas) allocation problem as
a hierarchical structure and implemented a combinatorial VCG
auction mechanism for solution. In most of the existing works,
the responsibility of MVNOs was missing and they did not
consider economic models of wireless network slicing. In our
work, we consider both two-level resource allocation problem
and economic model of wireless network slicing. Moreover,
we highlight the responsibility of MVNOs in the resource
allocation in wireless network slicing.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A wireless network slicing where a single InP having a
physical macro base station (MBS), and a set of mobile
virtual network operators, M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} that provides
particular mobile services to their users is shown in Fig. 1.
Specifically, in this work, we consider 4G architecture for
general virtualization, similar with the works in [15], [2].
The MBS is operating on the total bandwidth of R and
each MVNO m ∈ M provides services to the users Sm =
{1, 2, . . . , Sm}. A fraction of the total bandwidth R allocated
to each MVNO m ∈ M is defined as rm1. Here, a hypervisor
is deployed by the InP at the MBS to slice its physical
resources for leasing among multiple MVNOs. A central
question is how the InP will schedule its wireless bandwidth
1 Considering the 3GPP specification and standards for 4G architecture
[36], the resource allocation problem considers resource block (RB) as the
minimum allocation unit. However, to make the problem tractable, we use
the continuous form of resource as ‘bandwidth’, similar to the works in [37],
[38], [39], to solve the problem.
4TABLE I: Summary of Notations.
Notation Definition
M Set of MVNOs, |M| = M
Sm Set of mobile users of MVNO m ∈ M, |Sm| = Sm
R Total bandwidth capacity of an InP
rm Bandwidth allocated to MVNO m ∈ M
rm(b) Bandwidth allocated to MVNO m ∈ M depends on
the bidding vector b of MVNOs
b The vector of bidding values of MVNOs
bm Bidding value of MVNO m ∈ M
B Sum of bidding values of all MVNOs
vm(rm(b)) Valuation of MVNO m depends on the
allocated resource rm(b)
cm(b) Cost function of MVNO m ∈ M
qm Penalty value of MVNO m ∈ M
q The vector of penalty values of MVNOs
v′(rm(b)) Marginal valuation of MVNO m ∈ M
µm Market influence power of the MVNO m ∈ M
β The virtual price of bandwidth (per Hertz)
xm
s
The allocated resource to the user s ∈ Sm of MVNO
m ∈ M
E The resource competition matrix
em The vector of the resource allocated to MVNO m ∈ M
Q The penalty matrix
B The bidding matrix
amongst multiple MVNOs to give services to their mobile
users. Because the InP cannot access the information of users
such as QoS requirements and channel conditions. Therefore,
a possible solution is to allocate bandwidth to MVNOs first,
and afterwards each MVNO allocates the wireless bandwidth
to its users. This approach is regarded as a two-level solution
approach.
In this work, the resource (i.e., bandwidth) allocation prob-
lem in wireless network slicing is decomposed into two levels.
In the upper level, as shown in Fig. 2, the InP decides how to
efficiently allocate bandwidth to multiple MVNOs and which
aims to maximize the social welfare (i.e., aggregate valuation
of MVNOs). In the lower level, each MVNO manages resource
scheduling to its mobile users by considering its own utility.
We formulate the upper-level problem as an auction-based
resource allocation problem for which the GKM is proposed
for solution. Each MVNO m ∈ M will report its own bidding
value bm (0 ≤ bm < ∞) to the InP in each resource
allocation round. Depending on the bidding values of all
MVNOs, they will receive a proper allocation of bandwidth
form the InP. The bandwidth allocation among MVNOs will
be straightforward when the InP knows the characteristics (i.e.,
valuation) of the MVNOs. However, the valuation function is
the private information of each MVNO and it is related with
the dynamic channel conditions of its users. After that, each
MVNO will assign the bandwidth to its users as per their QoS
requirements.
IV. TWO-LEVEL RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN WIRELESS
NETWORK SLICING
In this work, the resource allocation problem in the wireless
network slicing can be decoupled into two levels: 1) resource
allocation between InP and MVNOs, and 2) resource alloca-
tion from MVNO to its mobile users.
Infrastructure Provider 
(InP)
MVNO - 1 MVNO - MMVNO - 2 . . . . . 
Mobile Virtual Network Operators
(MVNOs)
Fig. 2: Generalized Kelly Mechanism.
A. Upper-level Problem
Depending on the number of users and their QoS
requirement, each MVNO decides the required wireless
bandwidth. Let us define the valuation function
vm(rm(b)),b = {b1, b2, . . . , bM} is the vector of the
bidding value, as the satisfaction of the MVNO m ∈M.
Assumption 1 : The valuation function vm(rm(b)) is
strictly increasing, concave and continuous over the domain
rm > 0 .
This assumption is widely used for utility or valuation
functions in communication networks [17], [40], [41]. Here,
the InP will allocate its fraction of resource (bandwidth)
to each MVNO according to the reported bidding value of
MVNOs. It means that InP will allocate the largest ratio
of bandwidth to the MVNO with the highest bidding value.
Thus, the GKM framework [17] can be used to express the
interaction of InP and MVNOs, where the objective is to
maximize the aggregate valuation of MVNOs. Therefore, the
wireless bandwidth allocation to the MVNOs from the InP in
a virtualized network is formulated as follows:
max
∑
m∈M
vm(rm(b)) (1)
s.t. rm(b) ∩ rn(b) = ∅, for m 6= n, and m,n ∈ M,
(2)
M∑
m=1
rm(b) ≤ R, (3)
var. rm(b) ≥ 0, ∀m ∈ M, (4)
which considers the optimal division of the total bandwidth R
of the InP under the GKM. Constraint (2) ensures the isolation
between different MVNOs. As the MBS has limited amount of
bandwidth, constraint (3) guarantees the allocated bandwidth
of all MVNOs not exceed the total bandwidth of the MBS and
(4) ensures that the resource allocated to each MVNO must
be positive value.
Solving problem (1)-(4) is possible once the valuation of
MVNOs is known at the InP. However, the valuation is the
private value of each MVNO. Therefore, the MVNOs will not
5share these information to the InP so as to maximize their
own utilities with allocation of bandwidth. Upon submission
of the bidding value bm, each MVNO will receive the fraction
of the total bandwidth of MBS rm(b) accordingly. Let r =
{r1, r2, . . . , rM} be the resource allocation vector which is
determined by the proportional allocation [17] as follows:
rm(b) =
bm∑M
m=1 bm
R, ∀m ∈M, (5)
where
∑M
m=1 bm = B is the total bidding value at the InP.
Here, the proposed resource allocation scheme guarantees the
fairness among MVNOs [see Remark 1]. Each MVNO m ∈
M has the cost function cm(b) = qmbm which depends on
the bidding value bm and qm, the penalty parameter which
is varying according to the bidding value. Then, the payoff
function of the MVNO m is defined as
um(rm(b)) = vm(rm(b))− cm(b)
= vm(rm(b))− qmbm, ∀m ∈M,
(6)
where vm(rm(b)) is the valuation of MVNO m with allocated
resource rm based on bidding value bm and the penalty vector
of all MVNOs with the bidding value is q = {q1, q2, . . . , qM}.
Remark 1. The proportional allocation scheme can
maintain fairness amongst competing MVNOs. This is
because the allocation of resources is based upon the
proportion of bidding values of each MVNO, i.e., bidding
higher means getting more resource.
Proposition 1: The optimal bidding of each MVNO m ∈
M is
bm =
1
qm
rm(b)v
′(rm(b))(1 − µm), ∀m ∈ M, (7)
where µm is the market influence power of the MVNO m ∈
M to be explained later in this section.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 2: The unit penalty parameter for each MVNO
is
qm =
1
β
v′m(rm(b))
(
1−
rm(b)
R
)
, ∀m ∈M. (8)
Proof: See Appendix B.
However, the penalty parameter for each MVNO m ∈ M
depends on its valuation. As the valuation of each MVNO
is its private information, it will not reveal it to the InP. In
such a case, one can employ an iterative algorithm that allows
the InP to approximate the penalty for each MVNO from the
information of the previous iteration. Therefore, the penalty
for MVNO m ∈M at the kth iteration is as follows [18]:
qkm = q
k−1
m +
(
R− (rm(b))k−1
M − 1
−
Rqk−1m∑M
m=1 q
k−1
m
)
, ∀m ∈M.
(9)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Without the penalty parameter qm, ∀m ∈ M, each MVNO
will try to obtain a large proportion of wireless bandwidth
resource from the InP by bidding higher, in fact, as much as
possible. For this reason, the InP imposes a control parameter,
defined as the penalty vector q to obtain true valuations of
the MVNOs and balance the bandwidth allocation between
the competing MVNOs. In this regards, the InP interacts with
the MVNOs as follows: 1) InP informs the penalty parameter
qm to each MVNO m, 2) considering the penalty parameter,
each MVNO submits its bidding value bm to get resources
from the InP, and 3) the InP broadcasts the virtual price
of the bandwidth (per Hertz). Therefore, the virtual price of
bandwidth (per Hertz) is
β =
∑M
m=1 bm
R
. (10)
After knowing the virtual price for the bandwidth, each
MVNO can derive the fraction of the bandwidth it receives as
rm =
bm
β
, ∀m ∈ M. To this end, when there are few MVNOs
in the resource allocation, the bidding value of each MVNO
will largely influence the virtual price. Therefore, we can
observe that each MVNO is capable enough to manipulate the
outcome of the resource allocation game. However, an increase
in the number of MVNO will eventually eliminate such
influences, i.e., the market influence power of each MVNO
is low. In this regards, with an infinite number of MVNO in
the resource allocation, the individual market influence ability
of the MVNOs approaches to zero. Note that, in the real world,
an infinite number of MVNOs is not possible. Therefore, in our
formulation, we have considered the market influence power
of each MVNO m ∈M as
µm =
bm∑M
m=1 bm
, ∀m ∈M. (11)
From (11), we observe that the market influence power of
MVNO m ∈ M is coupled with the bids of other competing
MVNOs, however, these bids are their private information. In
such a case, one can employ an iterative algorithm that allows
the MVNO to know the approximate market influence power
from the information related with the previous iterations. Thus,
for the MVNO m ∈ M, its market influence power at the kth
iteration can be defined as
µkm = 1−
b
(k−1)
m q
(k−1)
m
(rm(b))(k−1)v′m
(
(rm(b))(k−1)
) . (12)
In our bandwidth allocation (i.e., bandwidth competition
among MVNOs) game, each MVNO will adopt a strategy bm
to maximize its utility um(b) as
um(bm; b−m, q) = vm(rm(b))− qmbm, m ∈M, (13)
where b−m = [b1, . . . , bm−1, bm+1, . . . , bM ] denotes the strat-
egy profiles of all the other MVNOs except m. Then, for
each MVNO, with the strategy profile b∗m, ∀m ∈ M, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the formulated resource
competition game if the following relation is satisfied:
um(b
∗
m; b
∗
−m, q) ≥ um(bm; b
∗
−m, q), ∀bm ≥ 0. (14)
Theorem 1 (Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium): WhenM >
1, at least two components of bm > 0 and Assumption 1
holds. For any qm ∈ q, there is a unique Nash equilibrium
for the resource competition game with the strategy profile
bm > 0, ∀m ∈M.
6Proof: See Appendix D.
In order to distinguish the equilibrium conditions of
this bandwidth allocation (i.e., resource competition among
MVNOs), the function vˆ(rm) is introduced as
vˆm(rm(b)) =
1
qm
(
1−
rm(b)
R
)
vm(rm(b))
+
1
qmR
∫ rm
0
vm(z)dz. (15)
The efficient bandwidth allocation to MVNOs in this resource
competition among MVNOs can be explored according to the
following optimization problem
max
∑
m∈M
vˆm(rm(b)) (16)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
rm(b) ≤ R, (17)
var. rm(b) ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M. (18)
Let r∗m be the solution to the above optimization problem.
Proposition 3: There exists a unique Nash equilibrium
of the resource allocation (i.e., resource competition among
MVNOs) shown in Theorem 1. Under that unique Nash equi-
librium, the allocated bandwidth rm to each MVNO m ∈M
is the solution to the above optimization problem shown in
(16) with constraints (17) and (18).
Proof: See Appendix E.
B. Lower-level Problem
In the lower-level, each MVNO aims at maximizing its
valuation by allocating the obtained bandwidth from the InP.
The valuation of each MVNO m ∈ M is the sum of the
logarithmic function of data rate of its users. Therefore, the
valuation of an MVNO m ∈ M can be defined as:
vm(rm) = max
Sm∑
s=1
log
(
xms rm log2
(
1 +
pshs
N0
)
+ 1
)
(19)
s.t.
Sm∑
s=1
xms ≤ 1, ∀m ∈M, (20)
var. xms ∈ [0, 1], ∀s ∈ Sm, ∀m ∈ M, (21)
where ps is the downlink transmitted power of the BS to a
mobile user s. Note that we assume fixed power allocation per
bandwidth (Hertz) in this paper. Moreover, hs is the channel
gain of user s, N0 is the noise power, and x
m
s represents
a fraction of bandwidth of MVNO m assigned to s where
xms ∈ rm. (20) and (21) are the constraints for the fraction of
wireless bandwidth allocated to each subscriber of the MVNO
m ∈M. As constraints (20) and (21) are linear, the constraint
set is affine and objective function (19) is concave. Therefore,
the valuation function vm(rm(b)) of each MVNO m ∈ M
satisfies Assumption 1.
C. Optimal Bandwidth Allocation
The bandwidth allocation problem in (19) is a convex
problem. Thus, the optimal solutions for (19) can be obtained
via Lagrangian duality [42]. Here, the Lagrangian of (19) is
L(xms , λ, ν) =
Sm∑
s=1
log
(
xms rm log2
(
1 +
pshs
N0
)
+ 1
)
+ λ
(
1−
Sm∑
s=1
xms
)
,
(22)
where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier defined for constraint
(21). By using the KKT conditions, we get the optimal
bandwidth allocated to each user s ∈ Sm as
xm∗s =
1
rm
(
1
|Sm|
[
rm +
Sm∑
s=1
1
α∗
]
−
1
α∗
)
, ∀s ∈ Sm. (23)
Proof: See Appendix F.
D. Lower-level Problem with Incomplete Information
In a practical scenario, it is hard for MVNOs to get
precise information of the channels (bandwidth) because of the
estimation errors, and the wireless channel delay. To address
the uncertainty of the wireless channel, in this work we
consider that the wireless bandwidth follows Rayleigh fading
[43]. Since there is no complete information at the MVNO,
we need to introduce an outage probability constraint in (19)
as
vm(rm) = max
Sm∑
s=1
log
(
xms rm log2
(
1 +
pms H
m
s
N0
)
+ 1
)
(24)
s.t. (20)− (21),
Prob
(
ρmins > log2(1 +
pms h
m
s
N0
)
)
≤ ǫ, ∀s ∈ Sm,
(25)
where ρmins = log2(1 +
pm
s
Hm
s
N0
), and ǫ is a predetermined
threshold on outage probability. In this work, without loss of
generality, we consider that the threshold value is the same for
all mobile users. Then, we can rewrite the outage probability
for the QoS constraint (25) as
Prob
{
ρmins > log2(1 +
pms h
m
s
N0
)
}
≤ ǫ,
⇔ Prob
{
γms ≤
2ρ
min
s − 1
pms
}
≤ ǫ,
⇔ ρmins ≤ log2(1 + p
m
s F
−1
γm
s
(ǫ)), (26)
where Fγm
s
(.) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
γms for the user s of the MVNO m and F
−1
γm
s
(.) is its inverse.
With Rayleigh fading, we get Fγm
s
as:
Fγm
s
(a) =
∫ a
0
a
σ2
e
−(a)2
2σ2 d(a)
= 1− e
−(a)2
2σ2 , (27)
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1: Initialization: Initialize q
(0)
m , b
(0)
m , µm ← 0, ∀m ∈M;
2: Set k ← 1
3: Each MVNO m ∈ M estimates the market influence
power µ
(k)
m according to (12);
4: The InP calculates the penalty for each MVNO q
(k)
m by
(9) and then informs each MVNO m ∈ M
5: Each MVNO m ∈ M updates the bidding value b
(k)
m by
(7) and then submits to the InP who then sends the virtual
price β(k) in (10) to all MVNOs;
6: for m = 1 to M do
7: Based on (5), the InP calculates the amount of band-
width r
(k)
m (b) to be allocated to MVNO m ∈M;
8: end for
9: The InP distributes r
(k)
m (b) to each MVNO m ∈M;
10: for m = 1 to M do
11: for s = 1 to Sm do
12: Each MVNO m allocates optimal bandwidth xms to
its mobile users based on (27);
13: end for
14: end for
15: Each MVNO m ∈M calculates v
(k)
m (rm);
16: Increment: k ← k + 1;
17: Repeat lines 3 to 15 until convergence.
where σ is the scale parameter, and a = 2
ρ
min
s −1
pm
s
.
From (24), we can remove the outage probability of the
QoS constraint in (26) and rewrite (19) as
vm(rm) = max
Sm∑
s=1
log
(
xms rm log2
(
1 + pms F
−1
γm
s
(ǫ)
)
+ 1
)
(28)
s.t. (20) and (21).
From the KKT conditions, we get the optimal bandwidth
allocation to each user s ∈ Sm as follows
xm∗s =
1
rm
(
1
|Sm|
[
rm +
Sm∑
s=1
1
ν∗
]
−
1
ν∗
)
, ∀s ∈ Sm, (29)
where ν∗ = log2(1 + p
m
s F
−1
γm
s
(ǫ)).
V. WIRELESS NETWORK VIRTUALIZATION WITH
MULTIPLE RESOURCES
In this section, we consider that each MVNO m ∈ M
needs C divisible (e.g., power, wireless bandwidth, antennas,
computation capacity, storage capacity, etc.,) at the same time
to service mobile users. We can model C × M resource
competition matrix E as
E = (e1, e2, . . . , eM) =


e11 . . . e1M
...
. . .
...
eC1 . . . eCM

 (30)
where (ec1 . . . ecM ) is the row vector that indicates the
allocation of the resource c ∈ C of the InP amongM MVNOs,
and em shows the allocation of C resources to an MVNO
m ∈M.
Assumption 2: The valuation function vm(em) is concave,
strictly increasing, and continuous over the domain em > 0
[17].
Here, we define the social welfare maximization problem in
multiple divisible resources as
max
∑
m∈M
vm(em) (31)
s.t. ecm ∩ ecn = ∅, for m 6= n, m, n ∈ M, ∀c ∈ C,
(32)
M∑
m=1
ecm ≤ Rc, ∀c ∈ C, (33)
var. ecm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M, ∀c ∈ C, (34)
where Rc is the maximum capacity of resource c ∈ C. (32)
ensures the intra-isolation among different MVNOs for all
resources c ∈ C of the InP. As the resources provided by
the InP are limited, (33) guarantees that the allocated resource
ecm to all MVNOs do not exceed the total resource capacity
Rc.
Similar to the resource competition matrix E, we define the
penalty matrix Q and the bidding values matrix B of MVNOs
as
Q =


q11 . . . q1M
...
. . .
...
qC1 . . . qCM

 , B =


b11 . . . b1M
...
. . .
...
bC1 . . . bCM

 , (35)
where qcm represents the penalty for MVNO m to bid for
resource ecm at the InP, and bcm denotes the bidding value
of MVNO m for the divisible resource c at the InP. Let us,
respectively, denote by qm and bm the penalty and bidding
value with regard to MVNO m ∈ M. Also denote by Qc
and Bc the penalty and bid with regard to the resource c ∈
C, respectively. The resource c ∈ C is allocated to MVNOs
according to
ecm(Bc) =
bcm∑M
m=1 bcm
, ∀c ∈ C. (36)
The utility function of MVNO m ∈ M is defined as
um(B,Q) = vm(em(B))− q
T
mbm, ∀m ∈M, (37)
where each MVNO chooses its bidding strategy to maximize
its utility defined as
um(bm; b-m,Q) = vm(em(B))− q
T
mbm, ∀m ∈M. (38)
The bidding profile matrix B∗ is a Nash equilibrium for any
MVNO m ∈ M if the following equation is satisfied:
um(b
∗
m; b
∗
-m,Q) ≥ um(bm; b
∗
-m,Q), ∀bm ≥ 0. (39)
The proof of the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium,
optimal resource allocation and optimal bidding value for each
MVNO are already shown in Section IV.
8Fig. 3: Bandwidth allocation to each MVNO under the
proposed (GKM) algorithm.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation setting and performance metrics
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
GKM algorithm in a wireless virtualized network for optimal
bandwidth allocation. The network scenario of our simulation
includes a single InP with one MBS and 4 MVNOs with
10, 5, 4, and 3 mobile users who are positioned randomly
within the coverage area of the MBS, respectively. The radius
of the macrocell is set as 500m. At the MBS, the maximum
available bandwidth is 10MHz, the maximum transmit power
is 43dBm, and the thermal noise density is considered as -
174dBm/Hz. The path loss model is PL = 40 log10(d0) −
10 log10(Gh
2
th
2
r)+ 10λ log10(
d
d0
)+Xg , where d is the actual
and d0 is the reference distance between the transmitter and the
receiver, respectively, ht and hr are respective heights of the
transmitter and the receiver, and a Gaussian random variable
Xg. The small-scale fading model is Rayleigh fading.
In this work, we maximize both aggregate valuation of
MVNOs, and the individual valuation of each MVNO by
optimizing the performance metrics of both bandwidth and
power.
B. Detailed Numerical Results
In this section, we will discuss the detailed numerical results
to show the efficacy of our proposed mechanism in a wireless
virtualized network.
Fig. 3 shows the bandwidth resource allocated to the
individual MVNOs under the proposed GKM algorithm.
Here, MVNO-1 is allocated 4.5455MHz, MVNO-2 is allo-
cated 2.273MHz, MVNO-3 is 1.812MHz and MVNO-4 is
1.364MHz, respectively. From the above results, we observe
that the MVNO who has more mobile users receives a larger
fraction of bandwidth resources owned by the InP. For this
reason, in Fig. 3 MVNO-1 is allocated more bandwidth
resources compared with the others. It is also clear that the
MVNO with more mobile users will invest or bid much more
than other MVNOs to get more bandwidth to fulfill the service
requirement of its mobile users.
Fig. 4 compares the achieved valuation for each MVNO as
the function of allocated bandwidth resource under different al-
gorithms: our proposed algorithm, the traditional Kelly Mecha-
nism [19], the Equal Sharing and the Optimal solutions. Under
the Equal Sharing mechanism, the InP allocates an equal
amount of bandwidth to all MVNOs. The Optimal solution
is achieved under zero market influence power of MVNOs,
i.e., no MVNO can alter the market price of the resource. This
scenario accounts for the price-taking buyers (MVNOs) which
is of our particular interest. As an example, from Fig. 4, we
observe that the median of the achieved valuation of MVNO-
1 is 119 (Proposed), 117 (Kelly Mechanism), 106 (Equal
Sharing), and 120 (Optimal). Moreover, we can also see the
lowest and the highest valuation of MVNO-1 is 106 - 133.5
(Proposed), 105.4 - 130 (Kelly Mechanism), 93 - 129.3 (Equal
Sharing), 109 - 133.6 (Optimal). Therefore, our proposed
algorithm achieves a higher valuation than doing the traditional
Kelly Mechanism and Equal Sharing for all MVNOs. Also, it
is comparatively close to the Optimal solution, demonstrating
its efficacy. It is clear that our solution approach is better than
the traditional Kelly Mechanism and the Equal Sharing.
Furthermore, Fig. 5 demonstrates the convergence of the
achievable valuation of MVNOs in the proposed Generalized
Kelly Mechanism (GKM). At the beginning of the algorithm,
as the fraction of bandwidth is randomly allocated to each
MVNO, the MVNOs evaluate the valuation randomly. In the
subsequent iterations, each MVNO chooses its best strategy,
i.e., bidding value, to achieve the highest valuation. From Fig.
5, we observe that our proposed GKM algorithm converges
to the equilibrium point in just 5 iterations. Here, MVNO-
1 achieves the highest valuation compared with the other
MVNOs. This is because it has more associated users, and
gets more fraction of bandwidth from the InP.
Fig. 6 demonstrates the solution for the lower-level problem.
The bandwidth resource for individual users in each MVNO
is assigned as per (23). From Fig. 6, we can notice that
the amount of bandwidth that MVNOs allocated to each of
their users. As an example, for MVNO-1, the median of the
allocated bandwidth to its mobile users are around (0.44, 0.46,
0.47, 0.46, 0.49, 0.43, 0.48, 0.48, 0.48, 0.49) MHz. From
results, the amount of bandwidth allocation among users of
the same MVNO are different.
In Fig. 7, we show the adversity of the number of users in
the network. We observe that our proposed algorithm obtains
the Optimal solution for the larger network. This is due to the
increase in the bidding value of the corresponding MVNOs
to the users for obtaining resources. Consequently, with the
increase in the number of buyers in the network, the market
price is less likely to be affected as discussed before. Similarly,
with the increase in the number of MVNOs, the achievable
aggregate valuation of each MVNO will be the same as the
optimal social welfare, as observed in Fig. 8.
Fig. 9 depicts the achieved data rate for each MVNO
under incomplete information. It is evident that the data rate
increases with a more relaxed outage constraint threshold. For
a sufficiently large outage threshold, a significant gain in the
achieved data rate is observed.
Fig. 10 represents the allocated power to each MVNO under
9Fig. 4: Comparison of the achieved valuation for (a) MVNO-1, (b) MVNO-2, (c) MVNO-3, (d) MVNO-4.
Fig. 5: Convergence of valuation of MVNOs in the proposed
GKM algorithm.
our proposed algorithm where the InP allocates 19.625dBm to
MVNO-1, 9.717dBm to MVNO-2, 7.83dBm to MVNO-3 and
5.827dBm to MVNO-4, respectively. This result is similar to
the bandwidth allocation because the MVNO who has more
mobile users gets a larger share of the resources. We also show
the power allocation from each MVNO to its respective users
in Fig. 11, which is the solution of the lower-level problem.
As we have discussed in the lower-level of the bandwidth
allocation problem, the power allocation to each user depends
on the channel condition which is assigned to that user.
Finally, Fig. 12 shows the achieved valuation for each
MVNO as the function of allocated bandwidth and power
resources by the InP under different algorithms. Similar to the
individual resource allocation, our proposed algorithm results
in a higher valuation than do the traditional Kelly Mechanism
and Equal Sharing scheme. Further, we observe that the valua-
tion is comparatively near to the Optimal solution. In Fig. 13,
we present the convergence of valuations of all MVNOs under
multiple resources (i.e., power, and bandwidth) allocation. We
observe the convergence of our proposed algorithm in lesser
than 8 iterations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated a two-level optimal
bandwidth allocation problem for wireless network slicing. In
the upper-level, the GKM is introduced to model MVNOs
as bidders who compete for the bandwidth from the InP
in order to serve their mobile users. The InP, who is the
seller of the resources, then executes the bandwidth allocation
process under the GKM to fulfill these requests. In the lower-
level, each MVNO allocates the optimal bandwidth resource
to its users. Morever, we consider the incomplete information
scenario where the MVNO does not know the exact channel
state information for its users. Finally, we consider the multiple
resource scenario where MVNOs compete with each other
for power and bandwidth resources from the InP. Simulation
results have reflected that the aggregated valuation of the
MVNOs following our proposed algorithm outperforms that
by the traditional Kelly Mechanism, Equal Sharing, and is
nearly close to the Optimal.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Differentiating (6) w.r.t the bidding value bm, the stationary
condition of (6) can be obtained as
v′(rm(b))
∂rm(b)
∂bm
− qm = 0. (40)
MVNO m ∈ M in this resource competition is a price-
anticipating agent, and the resource rm(b) allocated to MVNO
m is dependent on its bidding value bm. Therefore, using (10),
rm(b) =
bm
β
, and applying the first-order derivative, we have
∂rm(b)
∂bm
=
1
β
(
1−
bm
β
∂β
∂bm
)
. (41)
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Fig. 6: Bandwidth allocation to each user of (a) MVNO-1, (b) MVNO-2, (c) MVNO-3, (d) MVNO-4.
Fig. 7: Aggregate valuation of MVNOs for different number
of users.
Fig. 8: Aggregate valuation of MVNOs under different
number of MVNOs.
By using (10), the above (40) and (41) are rewritten as
v′(rm(b))
(
1−
bm
β
)
= βqm. (42)
According to (10), the optimal bidding strategy of MVNO m
is
bm =
1
qm
rm(b)v
′(rm(b))(1 − µm), ∀m ∈M. (43)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We will prove that the penalty value for each MVNO m ∈
M depends on its bidding value.
∂um
∂bm
= v′m(r(b))
(
(
∑M
m=1 bm − bm)R
(
∑M
m=1 bm)
2
)
− qm = 0, (44)
⇔
1
β
v′m(rm(b))(1 −
rm(b)
R
)− qm = 0, (45)
⇔
1
β
v′m(rm(b))(1−
rm(b)
R
) = qm. (46)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF UNIQUE PENALTY FOR EACH MVNO
From (43) and (10),
1
q∗m
v′m(r
∗
m(b))(R − r
∗
m(b)) =
M∑
m=1
bm, ∀m ∈M. (47)
Therefore,
q∗m : q
∗
n = v
′
m(r
∗
m(b))(R − rm(b)) : v
′
n(r
∗
n(b))(R − r
∗
n(b)),
∀m,n ∈M. (48)
Suppose the penalty vector q induces the optimal bandwidth
allocation vector r. The optimality condition for the optimal
bandwidth allocation is v′m(r
∗
m(b)) = v
′
n(r
∗
n(b)), ∀m,n ∈M
[18]. Therefore, (48) becomes
R− r∗m(b)
q∗m
=
R− r∗n(b)
q∗n
=
MR−R∑M
m=1 q
∗
m
, ∀m,n ∈ M. (49)
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Fig. 10: Power allocation at MVNOs.
From (42),
R− r∗m(b)
M − 1
=
q∗m∑M
m=1 q
∗
m
R. (50)
Inspired by the optimal condition in (50), we iteratively update
the penalty of each MVNO m ∈ M using the information
of the previous iteration. Therefore, at each iteration, the InP
updates the penalty of each MVNO according to
qkm = q
k−1
m +
(
R− (rm(b))k−1
M − 1
−
Rqk−1m∑M
m=1 q
k−1
m
)
, ∀m ∈M.
(51)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We prove that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in our pro-
posed resource competition among MVNOs with the different
bidding strategies bm > 0, ∀m ∈M.
First, we have
∂um
∂bm
= v′m(r(b))
(
b−mR
(
∑M
m=1 bm)
2
)
− qm = 0 (52)
⇔
1
qm
v′m
(
bmR∑M
m=1 bm
)(
b−mR
(
∑M
m=1 bm)
2
)
= 1 (53)
⇔
1
qm
v′m
(
bmR∑M
m=1 bm
)
×
(
R∑M
m=1 bm
−
bmR
(
∑M
m=1 bm)
2
)
= 1. (54)
When bm > 0, it is true that
1
qm
v′m
(
bmR∑M
m=1 bm
)(
R∑M
m=1 bm
−
bmR
(
∑M
m=1 bm)
2
)
= 1.
(55)
When bm = 0, we also have
1
qm
v′m(0) ≤ 1. (56)
There exists a unique Nash equilibrium [17] if the above two
conditions are satisfied.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The first-order derivative w.r.t rm(b) of (15) is
∂vˆm(rm(b))
∂rm(b)
=
1
qm
(1− µm)v
′
m(rm(b)). (57)
When µm and rm(b) are greater than zero,
∂vˆm(rm(b))
∂rm(b)
> 0
in (57). From (57), (1 − µm) is strictly decreasing in bm.
Moreover, the allocated bandwidth rm depends on the bidding
value bm of MVNO. Therefore, rm(b) is also decreasing.
Thus,
∂vˆm(rm(b))
∂rm(b)
is monotonically decreasing. For this reason,
vˆm(rm(b)) is a concave function, and hence, the optimization
problem (16) has a unique maximum value.
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Fig. 11: Power allocation to each user of (a) MVNO-1, (b) MVNO-2, (c) MVNO-3, (d) MVNO-4.
Fig. 12: Comparison of achieved valuation under multiple resources for (a) MVNO-1, (b) MVNO-2, (c) MVNO-3, (d)
MVNO-4.
Fig. 13: Convergence of valuation of MVNOs for multiple
resources in the proposed GKM algorithm.
Here, we define the Lagrangian of (16) as
L(rm, ρ) =
∑
m∈M
vˆm(rm(b)) + ρ
[
R−
M∑
m=1
rm(b)
]
, (58)
where ρ ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint
(16). Therefore, the KKT conditions can be expressed by using
the first-order derivative of (58) w.r.t rm and ρ as
∂L(rm, ρ)
∂rm(b)
=
1
qm
[(1 − µm)v
′
m(rm(b))]− ρ ≤ 0,
if rm ≥ 0,∀m ∈M, (59)
∂L(rm, ρ)
∂ρ
= R−
M∑
m=1
rm(b) ≥ 0, if ρ ≥ 0, (60)
When ρ > 0,
1
qm
v′m(rm(b))(1 − µm) = ρ. (61)
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From (43) and (61), ρ = β. By using (10), we can clearly
observe that the optimal bidding strategy in (7) is satisfied.
So, the optimal resource allocation to each MVNO at the
equilibrium is defined as follows:
r∗m(b) =
bmqm
v′(rm(b))(1 − µm)
, ∀m ∈ M. (62)
To sum up, 

ρ = β,
ρ > 0, when
∑M
m=1 rm(b) = R,
ρ = 0, when
∑M
m=1 rm(b) < R,
(63)
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF OPTIMAL BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION
The KKT conditions can be expressed with the first-order
derivative of (22) w.r.t xms and λ as
∂L
∂xms
=
log2
(
1 + pshs
N0
)
xms rm log2
(
1 + pshs
N0
)
+ 1
− λ ≤ 0,
if xms ≥ 0,∀s ∈ Sm, (64)
∂L
∂λ
= 1−
Sm∑
s=1
xms ≥ 0, if λ ≥ 0, (65)
Solving (64) gives the bandwidth allocated to each user s ∈
Sm as
xm∗s =
1
λ∗rm
−
1
rm log2
(
1 + pshs
N0
) , ∀s ∈ Sm, (66)
where
1
λ∗
=
1
|Sm|

rm + Sm∑
s=1
1
log2
(
1 + pshs
N0
)


+
. (67)
Thus, the optimal bandwidth allocated to each user s ∈ Sm is
xm∗s =
1
rm
(
1
|Sm|
[
rm +
Sm∑
s=1
1
α∗
]
−
1
α∗
)
, ∀s ∈ Sm (68)
where α∗ = log2
(
1 + pshs
N0
)
.
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